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The Normative Justification for Tax Exemption: 
Elements from Catholic Social Thought 
John F. Coverdale∗ 
The United States has granted exemption from most federal 
taxes to a wide range of organizations going back to the beginning of 
the Republic.  The earliest federal income tax statute, passed during 
the Civil War, applied only to individuals and exempted the trustees 
of charitable trusts.
1
  This tax proved short-lived and expired in 1872.  
The ill-fated income tax of 1894, declared unconstitutional in 1895,
2
 
exempted all charities from tax.
3
  The modern federal income tax, 
which traces its origins to the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909
4
 and to 
the Revenue Act of 1913,
5
 has from its inception granted statutory ex-
emption from income tax to religious, charitable, and other organi-
zations.   
Currently, the most important provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code in this area grants exemption to entities organized “for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or edu-
cational purposes” as well as for “fostering national or international 
amateur sports competition” and “prevention of cruelty to children 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  I wish to express my 
thanks to my research assistant Kelly Sinclair, J.D. 2010, for outstanding help.  I 
would also like to thank the participants in the conference Religious Legal Theory: 
The State of the Field held at Seton Hall University School of Law in November 2009 
for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
 1 The following year, in the face of the enormous financial pressure of the war, 
the tax was expanded to include an excise tax on corporations without any general 
exemption for charities.  This was, however, an exceptional measure, prompted by 
the special exigencies of wartime.  See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Concep-
tualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 605 & n.95 (1998). 
 2 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895); Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 586 (1895). 
 3 See ROGER FOSTER & EVERETT V. ABBOTT, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX UNDER THE ACT OF 1894, 103–04 (1895). 
 4 Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. 
 5 Tariff Act, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913). 
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or animals.”
6
  The list of potentially exempt purposes has developed 
over time without any overall guiding principle.
7
 
To qualify for tax exemption, in addition to engaging in certain 
types of activities, an organization must also be structured in such a 
way that “no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual.”
8
 
Scholars have criticized both the list of activities that qualify for 
tax exemption
9
 and the requirement that they be carried out by non-
profit organizations,
10
 but they have reached no consensus on how 
the law should be modified.  This is due, at least in part, to the fact 
that they do not agree about the normative justification for tax ex-
emption.  Until less than forty years ago, scholars paid little attention 
to this question, taking the fact of tax exemption as a given. 
In a groundbreaking article published in 1976, Boris Bittker and 
George K. Rahdert argued that the basic rationale for exemption is 
that “nonprofit organizations are not suitable targets for an income 
tax.”
11
  They rejected the view that statutory exemptions for nonprofit 
organizations constitute departures from a normative tax structure 
that require affirmative justification.
12
  Rather, they argued, exemp-
tion of public service nonprofit organizations (like the American Red 
Cross, museums, and universities) “is neither a special privilege nor a 
hidden subsidy.  Rather, it reflects the application of established 
principles of income taxation to organizations that, unlike the typical 
business corporation, do not seek profit.”
13
 
 
 6  26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  Numerous other subsections of the Internal 
Revenue Code grant exemption to a broad range of other organizations ranging 
from professional football leagues to mutual ditch and irrigation companies.  See, e.g., 
id. § 501(c)(6), (c)(12)(A). 
 7 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 9–27 (9th ed. 
2007).  Some of the most important items in the list of exempt purposes can be 
traced to the English Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.  Others are of much more 
recent origin.  See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 
Stat. 1520, 1730 (1976) (exemption for “certain amateur athletic organizations”). 
 8 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 9 See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: 
Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997). 
 10 See, e.g., Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 2017, 2021 (2007). 
 11 Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations 
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304 (1976). 
 12 See id. 
 13 Id. at 357–58.  With regard to mutual benefit organizations, like social clubs, 
Bittker and Rahdert argued that to the extent that their activities consist in the 
members’ doing together what they could do separately without incurring tax, the 
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Bittker and Rahdert noted that the author of the Revenue Act of 
1913, Representative Cordell Hull, justified the exemption of all 
nonprofit organizations on grounds that they did not have “net in-
come” within the meaning of the legislation.
14
  Hull seems to have 
understood this not as a technical matter based on some specific way 
of defining “net income” but rather simply as a way of saying that the 
tax was meant to affect only for-profit businesses.
15
  Bittker and Rah-
dert, however, developed an elaborate technical argument that it is 
impossible to measure the “income” of public service organizations.
16
  
They contended that there are insurmountable problems in deter-
mining both what receipts should be considered gross income and 
what disbursements should be considered deductible.
17
  Even if those 
problems could be resolved, they contended that further intractable 
problems would arise in attempting to determine the appropriate 
rate of taxation, since tax theory would require basing the rate on the 
status of the beneficiaries of the organization’s activities.
18
 
Five years later, Henry Hansmann largely demolished Bittker 
and Rahdert’s argument that exemption is justified by the technical 
difficulty of measuring the income of nonprofit organizations.
19
  He 
showed convincingly that any difficulty that might exist would be li-
mited to those nonprofit organizations that receive a large propor-
tion of their income from donations but not to the important class of 
nonprofit organizations that rely principally on fees for services, in-
cluding most nonprofit health care institutions.
20
  In addition, he 
pointed out that in the case of property taxes there would be no spe-
cial difficulty in measuring the value of property held by nonprofit 
organizations.
21
  Finally, he argued that the purported difficulty in de-
termining the appropriate rate rested on a false assumption that we 
need to determine the level of income of the beneficiaries of the ser-
 
fact of banding together to carry them out should not lead to tax consequences.  See 
id. at 358.  In the rest of this discussion, we will focus on Bittker and Rahdert’s treat-
ment of the traditional charitable organizations they call “public service” nonprofits. 
 14 Id. at 303. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. at 307–14. 
 17 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 11, at 307–14. 
 18 See id. at 314–16. 
 19 See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from 
Corporate Income Tax, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 58–62 (1981). 
 20 Id. at 59–60. 
 21 Id. at 93. 
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vices provided by nonprofit organizations rather than the income of 
the service provider.
22
 
Contemporary scholars approach consensus in rejecting Bittker 
and Rahdert’s theory that the income of nonprofit organizations 
simply falls outside the normative tax base.  They differ widely in 
their explanations of why organizations should be exempt from tax 
but generally concur in asserting that tax exemption represents a dev-
iation from the norm that all income should be taxed.  Therefore 
they consider tax exemptions for nonprofits a subsidy from the gov-
ernment to the organizations that enjoy exempt status.
23
  A wide 
range of theories exist to justify this subsidy. 
The most widely espoused theory, sometimes referred to as the 
public benefit subsidy theory, posits that tax exemption is justified by 
the fact that exempt organizations provide services to the public that 
the government otherwise would have provided.  This theory views 
tax exemption as a subsidy to those who relieve the government of 
burdens which would otherwise fall upon it.
24
  This, however, fails to 
account for the exemption of a large number of organizations rang-
ing from churches
25
 to country clubs,
26
 and from fraternal organiza-
tions like the Knights of Columbus
27
 to cooperative telephone com-
panies.
28
 
The defect of the public benefit subsidy theory, and more broad-
ly of all those theories that justify exemption on grounds that exempt 
 
 22 Id. at 64–66. 
 23 For elaborations on this rationale, see Rob Atkinson, Altrusim in Nonprofit Or-
ganizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 505 (1990) (describing the subsidy theory as “[t]he 
emerging orthodox account”); Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable 
Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1055–57 (2009); John D. Columbo, The Marketing of Phi-
lanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction 
and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 698 (2001); Mark P. Gergen, The Case 
for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (1988); Hans-
mann, supra note 19, at 71–72; David Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 531, 547, 552–53 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the “Contract Failure” 
Explanation for Nonprofit Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 1001, 1007 (1997); Brian D. Galle, Foundation or Empire? The Role of Charity in a 
Federal System 10 (FSU Coll. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 394, 2009), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473107 (“Most commentators . . . embrace the 
idea that the [exemption] is justified as a tool for encouraging the production of 
goods that would otherwise be under-produced by the private market.”). 
 24 See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 328 (3d ed. 2006). 
 25 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 26 See id. § 501(c)(7). 
 27 See id. § 501(c)(8). 
 28 Id. § 501(c)(12). 
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organizations fill gaps left by the operations of government and mar-
kets, is not, however, primarily that it cannot account for the full 
range of organizations that enjoy tax exemption.  The practice of tax 
exemption has grown up in patchwork fashion over a long period of 
time, and it is possible that no single theory can provide a coherent 
explanation for all the various categories that Congress has created. 
The real defect of these theories is that they rest, at least impli-
citly, on a flawed vision of society and ultimately of what it means to 
be human.  Although the scholars who have developed these theories 
rarely make explicit their overall view of society, much less of human 
nature, their theories seem to reflect a vision of society in which gov-
ernment is ultimately charged with meeting all social needs that mar-
kets cannot meet because of various forms of market failure. 
Many theorists would, it seems, be content to have government 
provide all necessary goods and services not furnished by markets, if 
only it could do so efficiently.  They see nonprofit organizations as 
merely filling gaps in the goods and services the government provides 
and devote much of their attention to explaining why those gaps ex-
ist.
29
  Approaching the problem in this way fails to provide a satisfying 
explanation of why people dedicate their energies to creating, sup-
porting, and operating nonprofit organizations.  Furthermore, it ig-
nores  the distinctive contribution to human flourishing of nonprofit 
organizations, which goes well beyond filling gaps in the goods and 
services provided by government. 
It is at this level that I believe Catholic Social Thought offers val-
uable elements that can contribute to our understanding of tax ex-
emption.  It does not address the many specific issues that necessarily 
arise in deciding which organizations should enjoy tax-exempt status 
and which should not.  To make that determination, one must take 
 
 29 With the passage of time, these theories have become increasingly complex as 
scholars have criticized the explanations for exemption put forth by their intellectual 
predecessors.  A very recent study by Brian Galle, for instance, critiques various as-
pects of the dual failure hypothesis, which assigns to government the role of provid-
ing those goods and services which would be underproduced by markets alone and 
exempts organizations from the role of providing those goods and services that are 
needed or desired by minorities who cannot wield sufficient influence to cause gov-
ernments to produce them in the desired quantity.  See Galle, supra note 23, at 4–5.  
Concretely, Galle argues that the existence of a federal structure and the insights of 
public choice theory both refute the claim that government will produce only those 
goods and services demanded by the median voter.  See id. at 16–20.  Nonetheless, he 
ultimately justifies exemption of charities on grounds that they “serve[] as gap-
filler[s] when federalism mechanisms break down.”  Id. at 1.  Thus at the end of the 
day, he ultimately sees the activities of exempt organizations only as filling gaps in 
the services provided by government. 
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into account technical tax and economic questions that fall outside 
the purview of Catholic Social Thought, such as the degree to which 
granting tax exemption to certain organizations that carry on activi-
ties that fall outside the scope of traditional exempt activities (for in-
stance, those often labeled as social entrepreneurship) would unduly 
burden for-profit organizations that compete with them. 
What Catholic Social Thought does offer is a coherent view of 
human nature and of the nature of society and government that ex-
plains the existence of exempt organizations.  It provides a reason for 
considering that the revenues of nonprofit organizations should be 
regarded as falling outside the normative tax base.  Those insights 
can serve as a foundation for resolving narrower and more technical 
issues.  Catholic Social Thought rests in large part on a philosophical 
and theological anthropology.  Especially in the years since the 
Second Vatican Council, philosophical and theological anthropology 
have played a foundational role in Catholic social thought.  John Paul 
II stressed that “man is the way of the Church.”
30
  An in-depth analysis 
of the underlying anthropology exceeds the scope of this Essay.  
Nonetheless, it is necessary to highlight at least a few elements of that 
philosophical and theological vision of what it means to be human 
because those elements are the foundation for the entire structure. 
One of the most basic tenets of Catholic Social Thought is that 
every human being is endowed with dignity and worth.  From a theo-
logical perspective, human dignity derives from having been created 
in “the image and likeness of God,”
31
 and of being “the only creature 
on earth that God willed for itself.”
32
  The Church holds that human 
beings find the foundation and development of their freedom and 
dignity in Christ.
33
  In him, whom the Church venerates as God-made 
man, “man has acquired full awareness of his dignity, of the heights 
to which he is raised, of the surpassing worth of his own humanity, 
and of the meaning of his existence.”
34
 
 
 30 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Centesimus Annus [The Hundredth Year] 
ch. VI (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Centesimus Annus], available at  
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html. 
 31 Genesis 1:27. 
 32 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Redemptor Hominis [Redeemer of Man] 
¶ 13 (Mar. 4, 1979), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis_en.html. 
 33 See id. ¶ 11. 
 34 Id. 
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Ultimately, the Church’s view of human dignity is theological 
and closely linked to its belief in creation and in the incarnation of 
God in Christ.  It is more immediately grounded, however, in the 
human faculties of intellect and free will, and in the fact that man is 
“a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, 
capable of deciding about himself, and with a tendency to self-
realization.”
35
  The basis of human dignity and of human rights is 
found in freedom and the capacity for self-determination.  Every hu-
man being has dignity because, as John Paul II put it, every human 
being is “capable of existing and acting ‘for itself,’ that is, capable of a 
certain autoteleology, which means capable not only of determining its 
own ends but also of becoming an end for itself.”
36
  At this level, 
Catholic Social Thought’s position on human dignity can be shared 
by all who recognize the fact of human freedom and self-
determination even without sharing the Church’s belief that they are 
ultimately rooted in God’s decision to make us in his own image and 
to take on in Christ our humanity. 
Catholic Social Thought does not view freedom and the ability 
to be an end for ourselves as an unfettered ability to choose whatever 
happens to appeal to each individual.  It is not the freedom described 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey as “the right to define one’s own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”
37
  Rather, Catholic Social Thought understands freedom 
as the uncoerced ability to know and embrace the truth and in the 
light of the truth to choose those things that contribute to human 
flourishing.
38
 
The function of government is to promote the conditions that 
permit human flourishing, conditions referred to in Catholic Social 
Thought as the common good.  The common good is not simply the 
aggregate of the goods of all members of society.  It is rather “the 
sum of all those social conditions which allow the human dignity of 
all to be respected, and their basic needs to be met, while giving men 
and women the freedom to assume responsibility for their own 
 
 35 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Laborem Exercens [On Human Work] ¶ 6 
(Sept. 14, 1981), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens_en.html. 
 36 KAROL WOJTYLA [POPE JOHN PAUL II], PERSONS AND COMMUNITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 
317 (Theresa Sandok trans., 1993). 
 37 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 38 See Centisemus Annus, supra note 30, ¶ 41. 
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lives.”
39
  It “involves an assessment and integration of [the] interests 
[of individuals] on the basis of a balanced hierarchy of values.”
40
  
Therefore, “ultimately, it demands a correct understanding of the 
dignity and the rights of the person.”
41
  Given this conception of the 
common good, the proper role of government will be determined by 
what constitutes human flourishing. 
Catholic thought, especially since the Second Vatican Council in 
the early 1960s, has stressed the role of gift and gratuitousness in 
human flourishing.  The Second Vatican Council proclaimed that a 
human being “cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift 
of himself.”
42
  Pope John Paul II returned frequently to this concept.  
In the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, he stated that man’s vocation “con-
sists in the sincere gift of self”
43
 and that we find “fulfillment through 
the gift of self and openness to others.”
44
  In his most recent encyclic-
al, Benedict XVI echoed this idea: “The human being is made for 
gift, which expresses and makes present his transcendent dimen-
sion.”
45
 
Catholic thought, with its long tradition of belief in original sin, 
is far from unaware of the all-too-human inclination to selfishness 
and lack of concern for others.  It has, however, maintained an ulti-
mately optimistic view that despite original sin humans are capable of 
generous concern for others.  Thomas Aquinas wrote in the thir-
 
 39 CATHOLIC BISHOP CONFERENCE OF ENG. & WALES, VOTE FOR THE COMMON GOOD 
2 (2001), http://www.catholicchurch.org.uk/content/download/1506/11693/file/ 
Vote%20for%20The%20Common%20Good_2001.pdf.  This concept stands in sharp 
contrast to large strands of American liberal thought that reject altogether the idea 
of common good and substitute in its place “the preservation of the maximum possi-
ble individual choice according to one’s private conception of the good.”  Louis Du-
pre, The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM 172, 183 
(R. Bruce Douglass ed., 1994). 
 40 Centesimus Annus, supra note 30, ¶ 47. 
 41 Id. 
 42 SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE 
MODERN WORLD: GAUDIUM ET SPES ¶ 24 (1965). 
 43 Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Evangelium Vitae [The Gospel of Life] ¶ 25 
(Mar. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Evangelium Vitae], available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html. 
 44 Id. ¶ 19. 
 45 Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter, Caritas in Veritate [Charity in Truth] ¶ 34 
(June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Caritas in Veritate], available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-
in-veritate_en.html. 
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teenth century that “it is natural to all men to love each other.”
46
  Not 
only are humans capable of generosity and self-giving.  It is precisely 
in overcoming selfishness and giving themselves to others that they 
find fulfillment.  In John Paul II’s words, “life attains its fullness in the 
sincere gift of self.”
47
 
Like other aspects of Catholic anthropology, this stress on “living 
in the dimension of gift”
48
 has a theological foundation.  In this case 
the foundation lies in the doctrine of the Trinity.  The Church un-
derstands God not as a solitary being but as a trinity of persons who 
live in communion with each other and give themselves unreservedly 
to each other.  For this reason, each person created in the image and 
likeness of God finds fulfillment in relation to other persons.  
“[E]xisting and acting together with other human beings enables him 
to achieve his own development, that is, the intrinsic development of 
the person.”
49
  More immediately, Christ’s commandment to “love 
one another as I have loved you”
50
 justifies stress on the gift of self as 
the way to human completion and fulfillment. 
Although its foundation is theological, Catholic anthropology’s 
position that we are called to find our fulfillment in communication 
with and concern for others also rests on observable facts.  As Bene-
dict XVI has noted, “Gratuitousness is present in our lives in many 
different forms, which often go unrecognized because of a purely 
consumerist and utilitarian view of life.”
51
  It is not surprising, there-
fore, that many who stand outside the Church’s tradition recognize 
the centrality of gift in human life.  To cite just a few examples, our 
capacity for entering into a mutual relationship with another “I” is at 
the core of Martin Buber’s in-depth exploration of the reality of in-
terpersonal relations and their consequences.
52
  Coming from an en-
 
 46 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, Bk. III, at 128 (Vernon J. Bourke 
trans., Hanover House 1956) (n.d.). 
 47 Evangelium Vitae, supra note 43, ¶ 86. 
 48 See John Paul II, Apostolic Letter, Dilecti Amici ¶ 8 (Mar. 31, 1985), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-
ii_apl_31031985_dilecti-amici_en.html. 
 49 KAROL WOJTYLA [JOHN PAUL II], THE ACTING PERSON 275 (Anna-Teresa Tymie-
niecka ed., Andrzej Potocki trans., rev. ed. 1979). 
 50 John 15:12 (English Standard). 
 51 Caritas in Veritate, supra note 45, ¶ 34. 
 52 See generally MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 2d ed. 
1958) (describing how human existence may be defined by the way in which we en-
gage in dialogue with each other, with the world, and with God).  There are many 
English editions.  One of the more recent is the 1996 Touchstone edition.  See gener-
ally MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1996).  In his book, Crossing 
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tirely different perspective, the psychologist and sociobiologist Frans 
de Waal argues for a biological and evolutionary foundation for altru-
ism and illustrates both its presence in animals and its importance for 
the working of society.
53
  Finally, in his often quoted speech at North-
western University’s commencement in 2006, then-Senator Barack 
Obama spoke of our “empathy deficit” and urged his audience to cul-
tivate a concern for others because “it’s only when you hitch your wa-
gon to something larger than yourself that you will realize your true 
potential—and become full-grown.”
54
 
The centrality of gratuitous self-giving in human flourishing un-
derlies the vision of society in Catholic Social Thought and explains 
the existence of the organizations that make up the exempt sector.  
In his most recent encyclical, Pope Benedict XVI, drawing upon Pope 
John Paul II, described society as composed of three broad sectors: 
“the market, the State, and civil society.”
55
  Civil society roughly corres-
ponds with the exempt sector.  As the President of the Pontifical 
Council for Justice and Peace, Archbishop (later Cardinal) Martino, 
pointed out to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the 
gift of self is the basis of the voluntary associations that make up civil 
society.
56
  The exempt sector is the primary, although not exclusive, 
locus of activities based principally not on “giving in order to acquire 
(the logic of exchange) and giving through duty (the logic of public 
obligation, imposed by State law),”
57
 but on “gratuitousness and com-
munion.”
58
 
If human beings attain their fulfillment in large part through the 
gift of self, the existence of organizations motivated by gratuitousness 
is fundamental to the well-being of society and is one of the condi-
tions of human flourishing that make up the common good.  As Be-
 
the Threshold of Hope, John Paul II recognized his indebtedness to Buber.  See JOHN 
PAUL II, CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF HOPE 36 (1994) (noting Buber’s impact on re-
ligious philosophy by commenting that “[t]he philosophers of dialogue, such as Martin 
Buber . . . have contributed greatly to [religious] experience”). 
 53 See generally FRANS DE WAAL, THE AGE OF EMPATHY: NATURE’S LESSONS FOR A 
KINDER SOCIETY (2009). 
 54 Senator Barack Obama, Northwestern University Commencement Address 
(June 16, 2006) (transcript available at http://obamaspeeches.com/079-
Northwestern-University-Commencement-Address-Obama-Speech.htm). 
 55 Caritas in Veritate, supra note 45, ¶ 38. 
 56 H.E. Archbishop Renato Raffaele Martino, Address at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (Sept. 2, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.un.org/ 
events/wssd/statements/holyseeE.htm). 
 57 Caritas in Veritate, supra note 45, ¶ 39. 
 58 Id. 
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nedict XVI wrote recently, “The earthly city is promoted not merely by 
relationships of rights and duties, but to an even greater and more 
fundamental extent by relationships of gratuitousness, mercy and 
communion.”
59
 
From this perspective, nonprofit organizations are important 
and should be fostered not merely because they fill gaps in the gov-
ernment’s provision of goods and services nor because they can in 
some instances provide them more efficiently than government.  
Their fundamental value and the reason for wanting to promote 
them (among other things through tax exemption) is that they pro-
vide a space in which the human inclination to gratuitous concern 
for others can easily be expressed.  Although “civil society” as the lo-
cus of gratuitousness does not entirely translate into the “tax exempt” 
sector, the two concepts are closely related, and the rationale for tax 
exemption can be found precisely in the gratuitous character of the 
activity that characterizes the exempt sector.
60
 
The government clearly has a need for funds and a right to call 
upon the citizens to provide them.  Not every activity that generates 
revenue is, however, a proper subject of taxation.  The federal gov-
ernment does not, for instance, impose tax on the revenues of other 
governmental units, and it would be inappropriate for it to do so.  
The proper source of the government’s funds and the proper object 
of taxation are the profits generated by activities undertaken to in-
crease the individual well-being of those who engage in them.  Activi-
 
 59 Id. ¶ 6.  Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the encyclical is Pope 
Benedict XVI’s suggestion that it is important to find ways of introducing gratuitous-
ness into the market as well.  See id. ¶ 36.  That topic, however, lies well outside the 
confines of this Essay. 
 60 This approach closely parallels the argument made by Professor Atkinson that 
altruism is a characteristic feature of exempt organizations and a major element in 
justifying their exempt status.  See Atkinson, supra note 23, at 510. Atkinson noted 
that other theorists had occasionally stressed altruism.  See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, 
Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 999, 1021 n.51 (1982) (“It has 
also been said that the core feature of charity is that it is not ‘self-regarding,’ but 
‘other-regarding.’”); Albert M. Sacks, The Role of Philanthropy: An Institutional View, 46 
VA. L. REV. 516, 519–20 (1960) (“To some . . . philanthropy is a working reflection of 
altruism, of ‘love of mankind,’ and therefore intrinsically inconsistent with private 
profit.”).  However, they generally found this characteristic only in nonprofits that 
rely heavily on donations, whereas Atkinson finds it also in “commercial” nonprofits 
which derive a significant portion of their revenues from fees. Atkinson, supra note 
23, at 542–43.  Atkinson, however, focuses on what he, following Amartya Sen and 
James Douglas, describes as “weak altruism” (i.e., a transfer without a quid pro quo).  
Id. at 532; see JAMES DOUGLAS, WHY CHARITY? 160 (1983); Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: 
A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 
(1970).  Because of his focus on the simple lack of consideration, Atkinson does not 
need to and does not propose any definite anthropological theory. 
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ties inspired by gratuitousness and solidarity are not conducted to ac-
quire something for the individuals who engage in them.  They are 
not motivated by the pursuit of private profit but rather express 
communion and concern for others.  Although they may in some in-
stances generate an excess of revenues over expenses, that excess is 
not properly a “profit” in the sense of an increase in private well-
being, which can appropriately be taxed by the government. 
Viewed in this light, the revenues generated by activities inspired 
by gratuitousness and a sense of solidarity rather than by the pursuit 
of private gain fall outside the range of activities that the government 
may properly consider as a potential source of funds.  They are not 
part of the tax base, but not (as Bittker and Rahdert argued) because 
of technical difficulties in measuring them or because of difficulties 
in determining the proper rate, but because income for tax purposes 
should be understood as comprising those revenues that are available 
for private consumption, not those that are dedicated out of gratuit-
ous benevolence to contributing to the well-being of others. 
Tax exemption for activities inspired by the gratuitous desire to 
help fellow human beings is appropriate as a way of contributing to 
the common good because they form part of the complex of condi-
tions that contribute to human flourishing.  They do so by providing 
goods and services, such as education and health care, which are es-
sential to human flourishing.  But so, in one degree or another, do a 
vast range of activities that the government should and must tax if it is 
to raise the funds it needs for its operations.  Farmers who provide 
our food, contractors who build our houses, utility companies that 
supply our electricity, and a myriad of other people engaged in a vast 
range of activities contribute to the common good, arguably no less 
directly and no less importantly than do educators and health care 
providers who work in nonprofit organizations. 
What justifies exempting from taxation activities of nonprofit 
organizations inspired by solidarity and a sense of community is not 
so much the goods and services they provide as the fact that tax ex-
emption encourages and facilitates gratuitous and self-giving beha-
vior, which is itself a central element of human flourishing. 
Supporting nonprofit organizations through tax exemption con-
tributes to the common good also by fostering the exercise of free-
dom, responsibility, and self-determination.  This responds to one of 
the central tenets of Catholic Social Thought: the principal of subsi-
diarity.  Before we can see why this is true, we need to explore briefly 
the principle of subsidiarity and its foundations. 
COVERDALE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2010  5:03 PM 
2010] THE NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION 901 
The principle of subsidiarity rests on a vision of human nature 
and society.  Because Catholic Social Thought sees humans as natu-
rally social beings who achieve their fulfillment not in isolation but as 
members of diverse groups, it sees the good society not as a giant 
monolith but as a composite made up of a multiplicity of groups of 
all sorts and sizes that are formed to carry out diverse purposes.  
Among the smallest of these is the family, which Catholic thought 
sees as a “natural society” and as a fundamental building block of 
larger societies.
61
  At the opposite end of the spectrum, Catholic 
thought also considers the nation, which finds expression in the state, 
as a natural society required for human flourishing.
62
  Beyond the 
state lies the world community to which all humans belong by virtue 
of sharing the same God-given nature over and above the many dif-
ferences that separate them. 
In this vision, large social units, like the nation, “consist[] of 
plural and intrinsic forms, not ‘masses’ to be aggregated.”
63
  The mul-
tiplicity of small social groups, which constitute civil society, are not 
creations of the larger units that constitute government.  They are 
expressions of the innate human tendency toward friendship with 
others and the concrete expression of the solidarity that derives from 
it.  Furthermore, they have distinctive functions for which they are 
formed and that their distinctive characteristics equip them to carry 
out.
64
  Far from existing only by the sufferance of government, they 
are the essential building blocks of larger societies and the common 
good.  “[T]hey bring about mutual perfection by free activity, with 
the emphasis upon the activity more than the product.”
65
 
It is in this light that Catholic thought has elaborated the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity.  Pope Leo XIII expressed the core of the prin-
ciple in the encyclical Rerum Novarum: 
 The State should watch over these societies of citizens banded 
together in accordance with their rights, but it should not thrust 
 
 61 See John Paul II, Gratissimam Sane [Letter to Families] ¶ 7 (Feb. 2, 1994), avail-
able at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/letters/documents/hf_jp-
ii_let_02021994_families_en.html. 
 62 Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Pope John Paul II (1920–2005), in 1 THE 
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 220, 242–
43 (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006). 
 63 Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF 
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 62, at 3, 22. 
 64 See generally Patrick McKinley Brennan, Harmonizing Plural Society: The Case of 
Lasallians, Families, Schools—and the Poor, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2007). 
 65 Russell Hittinger, Pope Leo XIII  (1810–1903), in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN 
CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 62, at 39, 59. 
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itself into their peculiar concerns and their organization, for 
things move and live by the spirit inspiring them, and may be 
killed by the rough grasp of a hand from without.
66
 
 The locus classicus for this doctrine is Pius XI’s encyclical Qua-
dragesimo Anno which does not employ the term subsidiarity but offers 
the following description of the principle: 
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave 
evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and 
higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can 
do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help 
to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb 
them. 
 The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let sub-
ordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser impor-
tance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly.  Thereby 
the State will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those 
things that belong to it alone . . . .
67
 
Both of these papal formulations express the principle in largely 
negative terms, as a limitation on state power and intervention.  Pius 
XI’s formulation could also be understood as justifying the principle 
primarily in terms of efficiency.  Understood in these terms, subsi-
diarity would be about allowing functions to be carried out at the lev-
el where they can be done most effectively and as a justification for 
limited government. 
While these are legitimate aspects of the principle, it is richer 
and more profound than that and more deeply linked to the central 
role of freedom in human life and the subjectivity of the human per-
son.  “It is not only that granting freedom to individuals and the vo-
luntary associations that they form will release human creativity, but 
that the release of creativity is itself an intrinsic good.  True develop-
ment of the human person requires his or her participation.”
68
 
 
 66 Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, Rerum Novarum [On Capital and Labor] ¶ 55 
(May 15, 1891), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html. 
 67 Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Quadragesimo Anno [The Fortieth Year] ¶¶ 79–
80 (May 15, 1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html. 
 68 Richard Esenberg, A Good Crisis and an Opportunity: The Lessons of Catholic Social 
Teaching, PRAWFSBLAWG.COM, Sept. 17, 2009, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2009/09/in-conjunction-with-some-papers-that-i-am-completing-i-have-
been-thinking-a-lot-about-the-catholic-notion-of-subsidiarity-an.html. 
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In Catholic Social Thought, the government does not graciously 
allow lower-level societies to carry out functions it could legitimately, 
if perhaps less efficiently, fulfill.  Rather, subsidiarity involves “respect 
for a pluriform social order” in which “each person is capacitated . . . 
to contribute to the common good according to his proper office and 
role.”
69
  According to the principle of subsidiarity, higher-order socie-
ties should not only allow lower-order societies to carry out their 
proper functions but should also remove barriers to their doing so 
and, when necessary, provide support and aid. 
This is the second justification for extending tax exemption to 
organizations inspired by gratuitousness.  Tax exemption (and per-
haps more importantly, the deductibility of contributions) facilitates 
the operations of exempt organizations by freeing them from the 
burdens of taxation.  It does so in an unobtrusive fashion, with a min-
imum of government interference in the operations of the exempt 
organizations.  This not only permits those organizations to meet the 
needs of society in areas like education and health care, but it also 
encourages people to exercise their freedom, initiative, and respon-
sibility.  It is, therefore, a very direct and appropriate way for the gov-
ernment to foster the common good by providing the conditions that 
contribute to human flourishing. 
In conclusion, Catholic Social Thought stresses freedom and 
self-determination as essential elements of human dignity.  It holds 
that persons are the ultimate value, but that they are essentially social.  
It discovers in self-giving one of the principal elements of human 
flourishing, and it sees society as made up of groups that arise more 
or less spontaneously as a result of our innately social makeup.  All of 
these elements suggest that those organizations that are motivated by 
gratuitousness rather than by the desire for personal profit deserve to 
be considered as lying outside the normative tax basis and therefore 
merit tax exemption. 
 
 
 69 Hittinger, supra note 63, at 23. 
 
